The Report of the Committee on Revisiting & Revitalising the
PPP model of Infrastructure Development chaired by Dr. V. Kelkar has been
issued and also uploaded on the Ministry of Finance’s website (finmin.nic.in).
In the Union Budget 2015-16, the Finance Minister Shri Arun
Jaitley had announced that the PPP mode of infrastructure development has to be
revisited and revitalised. In
pursuance of this announcement, a Committee on Revisiting & Revitalising
the PPP model of Infrastructure Development was set-up which was chaired by Dr.
Vijay Kelkar. The Report of the Committee submitted to the Government has been
uploaded on the Ministry of Finance’s website.
(http://finmin.nic.in/reports/ReportRevisitingRevitalising
PPPModel.pdf).
The Executive Summary of the Report is as
follows:
Highlights of the Report
1.Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure refer
to the provision of a public asset and service by a private partner who has
been conceded the right (the “Concession”) for the purpose, for a specified
period of time, on the basis of market determined revenue streams, that allow
for commercial return on investment.
2. PPPs in infrastructure represent a valuable instrument to
speed up infrastructure development in India. This speeding up is urgently
required for India to grow rapidly and generate a demographic dividend for
itself and also to tap into the large pool of pension and institutional funds
from aging populations in the developed countries.
3. India offers today the world’s largest market for PPPs.
It has accumulated a wealth of experience in getting to this premiere position.
As the PPP market in infrastructure matures in India, new challenges and
opportunities have emerged and will continue to emerge. Periodic review of
PPPs, as in the present Committee's remit, are a must to help address issues
before they become endemic and to mainstream innovations and foster new ones
that improve the successful delivery of PPP projects.
4. India’s success in deploying PPPs as an important
instrument for creating infrastructure in India will depend on a change in
attitude and in the mind-set of all authorities dealing with PPPs, including
public agencies partnering with the private sector, government departments
supervising PPPs, and auditing and legislative institutions providing oversight
of PPP’s.
5. The Government may take early action to amend the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which does not distinguish between genuine
errors in decision-making and acts Report of the Committee on Revisiting and
Revitalising the PPP Model of Infrastructure. Measures may be taken immediately
to make only malafide action by public servants punishable, and not errors, and
to guard against witch hunt against government officers and bureaucrats for
decisions taken with bonafide intention. The government may speed up amendment
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Vigilance and Conduct rules applicable to
government officers.
6. Experience has also underlined the need to further
strengthen the three key pillars of PPP frameworks namely Governance,
Institutions and Capacity, to build on the established foundation for the next
wave of implementation.
7. In addition to changing mind-sets, there is an urgent
need to rebuild India’s PPP capacities. Structured capacity building programmes
for different stakeholders including implementing agencies and customized
programmes for banks and financial institutions and private sector need to be
evolved. The need for a national level institution to support institutional
capacity building activities must be explored. Every stakeholder without
exception has strongly emphasised the urgent need for a dedicated institute for
PPPs as was announced in the previous Budget. The Committee strongly endorses
the “3PI” which can, in addition to functioning as a centre of excellence in
PPPs, enable research, review, roll out activities to build capacity, and
support more nuanced and sophisticated models of contracting and dispute
redressal mechanisms (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.1.4). A dynamic 3PI can support a
dynamic process of infrastructure design, build, and operate in India and
thereby help deliver on the promise of reliable infrastructure services for all
citizens.
8. The Committee cannot overstate the criticality of setting
up of independent regulators in sectors that are going in for PPPs. The
Committee recommends setting up these independent regulators with a unified
mandate that encompasses activities in different infrastructure sub sectors to
ensure harmonized performance by the regulators (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.1.8).
9. The Committee welcomes the current review and amendment
of the Arbitration Act, and strongly endorses the need for time limits on
hearings.
10. The dominant, primary concern of the Committee was the
optimal allocation of risks across PPP stakeholders. Inefficient and inequitable
allocation of risk in PPPs can be a major factor in PPP failures, ultimately
hurting the citizens of India. The Committee notes that the adoption of the
Model Concession Agreement (MCA) has meant that project specific risks are
rarely addressed by project implementation authorities in this “One-size-fits-
all” approach. A rational allocation of risks can only be undertaken in sector
and project-specific contexts.
.
11. For the next generation of PPP Contracts, the Committee
suggests the following broad guidelines while allocating and managing risks: 1)
an entity should bear the risk that is in its normal course of its business; 2)
an assessment needs to be carried out regarding the relative ease and
efficiency of managing the risk by the entity concerned; 3) the cost
effectiveness of managing the risk needs to be evaluated; 4) any overriding
considerations/stipulations of a particular entity need to be factored in prior
to implementing the risk management structure.
5) DEA, or preferably the 3PI, should deploy sophisticated
modeling techniques that exist to assess risk probabilities and the need to
provision for them; and (6) there should be ex-ante provisioning for a
renegotiation framework in the bid document itself (Chapter 4, paragraph
4.1.6).
12. Typically infrastructure PPP projects span over 20-30
years and a developer often loses bargaining power related to tariffs and other
matters in case there are abrupt changes in the economic or policy environment
which are beyond his control. The Committee feels strongly that the private
sector must be protected against what have been called “Obsolescing
Bargain”-the loss of bargaining power over time by private player in
PPPs-through the four mechanisms discussed in Chapter 4 including the setting
up of Independent Sector Regulators.
13. PPP projects can become distressed when risks emerge
that may not have been contemplated at the time of signing. This could give
rise to a call for amending the terms of the Concession Agreement to reflect
new project realities better (Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2). The Committee has
suggested benchmarks in Chapter 4 to be applied to each proposed renegotiation
as well as set out a set of conditions that should not be accepted as valid reasons
for a request for amendment of a concession agreement (Chapter 4, paragraphs
4.3.6 and 4.3.7).
14. The final decision on a renegotiated concession
agreement must be based on 1) full disclosure of the renegotiated estimated
long-term costs, risks and potential benefits; 2) comparison with the financial
position for government at the time of signing the concession agreement; and 3)
comparison with the existing financial position for government just prior to
renegotiation. This will permit the authority regulating the Report of the
Committee on Revisiting and Revitalising the PPP Model of Infrastructure xi
concession to take a decision based on a full comparison of the likely outcomes
over the future of the concession (Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.3.8 and 4.3.9).
15. The Committee notes that there a number of stalled PPP
projects need to be kick started. There is an urgent need to evolve a suitable
mechanism that evaluates and addresses “actionable stress”-using stress and
adversity to deal with the underlying systemic problems (Chapter 5, paragraph
5.3.3). Sector specific institutional frameworks should be developed to address
these stalled infrastructure projects. The proposed Tribunal and IPAT approach,
in the Committee's view are the possible solution (Chapter 5, paragraphs 5.3.15
and 5.3.16). The Committee is of the view that only a statutorily established
credible empowered multi-disciplinary expert institutional mechanism may be
able to deal with the complex issues involved (Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.4).
16. The Committee recognizes the need for a quick,
equitable, efficient and enforceable dispute resolution mechanism for PPP projects.
It is suggested that PPP contracts have clearly articulated dispute resolution
structures that demonstrate commitment of all stakeholders and provide
flexibility to restructure within the commercial and financial boundaries of
the project, (Chapter 8, paragraph 8.2.1).
17. In the wake of new project proposals emerging in various
infrastructure sectors, the Committee recommends that appropriate legal
frameworks be developed against which these can be evaluated (Chapter 6,
paragraph 6.2.1).
18. The authorities may be advised against adopting PPP
structures for very small projects, since the benefits of delivering small PPP projects
may not be commensurate with the resulting costs and the complexity of managing
such partnerships over a long period. The transaction costs of well-structured
PPP projects are significant, including essential but expensive expert advisory
services (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.6).
19. Unsolicited Proposals (“Swiss Challenge”) may be
actively discouraged as they bring information asymmetries into the procurement
process and result in lack of transparency and fair and equal treatment of
potential bidders in the procurement process (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.7).
20. Inherent in the concept of PPP is the role of a “Private
Sector Partner” that will implement the project, based on the need to leverage
private sector financing and also the managerial and operational efficiencies
of the private sector party. It is in this context that the Committee is of the
view that since state owned entities SoEs/PSUs are essentially Government
entities and work within the government framework, they should not be allowed
to bid for PPP projects.
21. The authorities should not treat PPPs as an off-balance
sheet funding method for the government’s responsibility of providing reliable
infrastructure services to its citizens. PPPs should not be used as the first
delivery mechanism without checking its suitability for a particular project.
States and other agencies should also not treat Central PPP VGF as a source of
additional grants that can be accessed by adopting a PPP delivery mode for
projects that are not suitable for such a long-term financing structure
(Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.8).
22. There have been concerns raised by all stakeholders
(Government and Private Sector alike) on the demand for developer books of
account being subjected to government audit and for access under RTI and
Article 12 of Constitution. Conventional audit by authority of private
partner’s books as per standard procurement process risks delivery of poor
quality of service/ public asset provision if there is no certainty of
processes in the medium term. To address this, the Committee recommends that
the government notify comprehensive guidelines on the applicability and scope
of such activities. The laid down process would enable review only of
government internal systems, and not that of SPVs but SPVs would need to follow
best practice in corporate governance systems including those related to
related party transactions, financial disclosures etc as in the Companies Act,
2013.
23. Monetisation of viable projects that have stable revenue
flows after EPC delivery may be considered. This should be seen as a
monetisation opportunity that can attract risk averse long-term funding like
pension and institutional investors. By providing O&M PPP opportunities,
the authority will be able to free up budgetary funds for fresh EPC and start a
virtuous cycle of fresh investment fed by additional revenues (Chapter 7,
paragraph 7.1.8).
24. Equity in completed, successful infrastructure projects
may be divested by offering to long-term investors, including overseas institutional
investors as domestic and foreign institutional investors with long-term
liabilities are best suited for providing such long-term financing, but have a
limited appetite for risk. Cash generated out of divestment of equity would be
available for the creation of new infrastructure projects in the country
25. Improving a PPP project’s risk profile so that it is
more suitable for overseas and domestic long-term investors can be accomplished
through partial recourse to credible third-party institutions. This could be
implemented through a partial credit guarantee or cash flow support mechanisms
(Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.12).
26. It is necessary to explore options for sourcing long
term capital at low cost. Towards this, the Committee recommends, encouraging
the banks and financial institution to issue Deep Discount Bonds or Zero Coupon
Bonds (ZCB) (Chapter 7, paragraph 7.1.15). These will not only lower debt
servicing costs in an initial phase of project but also enable the authorities
to charge lower user charges in initial years.
27. Some countries have a legal framework for PPPs in the
form of PPP Act/Law/Policy. MoF may develop and publish a national PPP Policy
document. Ideally, such a policy Report of the Committee on Revisiting and
Revitalising the PPP Model of Infrastructure xiii document should be endorsed
by the Parliament as a policy resolution to impart an authoritative framework
to implementing executive agencies as well as to legislative and regulatory
agencies charged with oversight responsibilities (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.2).
The Committee recommends an assessment of whether formulating and enacting a
PPP Law will facilitate successful expansion of PPP into new sectors, including
health, other social sectors, and urban transport (Chapter 10, paragraph
10.1.1).
28. In the final analysis, the success of deploying PPP as
an additional policy instrument for creating infrastructure in India will
depend on the change in attitudes and mindsets of all the authorities including
public agencies partnering the private sector, government departments
supervising the PPPs, and auditing and legislative institutions providing
oversight of the PPPs. The PPP reflects a paradigm shift involving the private
sector. It means moving away from “transaction to relationship,” accommodating
“give and take” between private and public sector partners, and finally
accepting uncertainties and appropriate adjustments inherent in implementing
long-time contracts. The Committee urges all parties concerned to foster trust
between the private sector and public sector partners in implementing PPP. As
mentioned earlier in the report, PPP is an additional policy instrument to
enable India to save time. Since the “demographic dead-lines” are staring at
us, there is need to accelerate growth. By all accounts, there are only two or
three decades left for India to complete the transition from a low-income
country to a high-income and developed economy by overcoming the “middle income
trap” (Chapter 10, paragraph 10.2.1). a. Contracts need to focus more on
service delivery instead of fiscal benefits (Paragraph 2.5.5, viii). b. Better
identification and allocation of risks between stakeholders (Paragraph 2.5.5,
viii). c. Prudent utilization of viability gap funds where user charges cannot
guarantee a robust revenue stream (Paragraph 2.5.5, viii). d. Improved fiscal
reporting practices and careful monitoring of performance (Paragraph 2.5.5,
viii). a. Given the urgency of India’s demographic transition, and the
experience India has already gathered in managing PPPs, the government must
move the PPP model to the next level of maturity and sophistication (Paragraph
3.1.7).
B. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Revisiting
PPPs: Achievements and Challenges
a. Contracts need to focus more on service delivery instead
of fiscal benefits
b. Better identification and allocation of risks between
stakeholders
c. Prudent utilization of viability gap funds where user
charges cannot guarantee a robust revenue stream .
d. Improved fiscal reporting practices and careful
monitoring of performance a. Given the urgency of India’s demographic
transition, and the experience India has already gathered in managing PPPs, the
government must move the PPP model to the next level of maturity and sophistication.
2. Why it is Urgent for India to get
Infrastructure PPPs.
a.Given the urgency of India’s demographic transition, and
the experience India has already gathered in managing PPPs, the government must
move the PPP model to the next level of maturity and sophistication (Paragraph
3.1.7).
b. The Committee feels strongly
that maturing the PPP model in India is an urgent priority also to take advantage
of this historical conjunction of India’s infrastructure needs and the
availability of long-term funding
c. PPPs have the potential to deliver infrastructure
projects both faster and better. Building on India’s 15 years of experience
with PPPs, there is need to iron out the difficulties in the performance of PPP
at every stage of the contract (Paragraph 3.5.2).
3. Re-balancing of risk Sharing :
a. An assessment needs to be carried out regarding the
relative ease and efficiency of managing the risks by the entity concerned
(Paragraph 4.1.6).
b. Cost effectiveness of managing the risk needs to be
evaluated (Paragraph 4.1.6).
c. Sophisticated modelling techniques are prevalent to
assess probabilities of risks and the need to provision for them. DEA may hone
its skills in this and provide guidance to project authorities (Paragraph
4.1.6).
d. The final decision for a renegotiated Concession
Agreement must be based on (Paragraph 4.3.8):
- Full disclosure of long-term costs, risks and potential
benefits;
- Comparison with the financial position for government at
the time of signing the Concession Agreement;
- Comparison with the financial position for government at
the time prior to renegotiation.
4. Resolving Legacy Issues
a. Only a statutorily established credible empowered
multi-disciplinary expert institutional mechanism can deal with the complex
issues involved (Paragraph 5.3.4):
- An Infrastructure PPP Project Review Committee (“IPRC”)
may be constituted to evaluate and send its recommendations in a time-bound
manner upon a reference being made of “Actionable Stress” in any Infrastructure
Project developed in PPP mode beyond a notified threshold value.
- An Infrastructure PPP Adjudication Tribunal (“IPAT”)
chaired by a Judicial Member (former Judge SC/Chief Justice HC) with a
Technical and/or a Financial member, where benches will be constituted by the
Chairperson as per needs of the matter in question
b. In case procurement of land or clearance is pending from
government authorities for more than prescribed number of days, the outstanding
work should be descoped (under the provisions of Change in Law of Concession
Agreement), and allow rest of activities for completed work. Balance work could
be completed on a cash-contract basis, provided land and required clearances
are in place (Box 6).
c. Cancel projects that have not achieved a prescribed
percentage of progress on the ground. Rebid them once issues have been resolved
or complete them through public funds and if viable, bid out for Operations and
Maintenance (Box 6).
5. Generic, Including Legacy Projects
a. Sector specific institutional frameworks may be developed
to address issues for PPP infrastructure projects (Chapter 5, paragraph
5.3.15). An entity should bear the risk that is in its normal course of its
business (for instance, acquisition of land is a normal course of business for
public entities).Overriding considerations/ stipulations of each entity to be
factored in prior to implementation of risk management structure (Chapter 4,
paragraph 4.1.6).
b. Learnings from the Highways sector to be utilized for
other sectors to customize and adopt such frameworks (Chapter 5, paragraph
5.3.15).
c. Umbrella guidelines may be developed for stressed
projects that provide an overall framework for development and functioning of
the sector specific frameworks (Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.16).
d. DEA to finalize a national PPP Policy document (Chapter
6, paragraph 6.2.2).
e. Unsolicited Proposals (“Swiss Challenge”) to be
discouraged to avoid information asymmetries and lack of transparency (Chapter
6, paragraph 6.2.7).
f. PPP structures not to be adopted for very small projects
in view of the transaction costs involved. DEA to issue a threshold guidance
(Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.6).
5. Chapter 6- Strengthening Policy, Governance
and Institutional Capacity
a. Amend the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to
distinguish between genuine errors in decision-making and acts of corruption
(Paragraph 6.1.6).
b. Build up capacity in all stakeholders, including
regulators, authority, consultants, financing agencies, developers (Paragraph
6.1.2).
c. Set up an institution for invigorating private
investments in infrastructure, providing guidance for a national PPP policy and
developments in PPP, developing a mechanism to capture and collate data for
decision making, undertaking capacity building activities. The 3P-I institute
for PPPs announced in 2014 may be set-up without delay (Paragraph 6.1.4).
d. Pre-qualified PPP consultancies could be empanelled by
DEA as earlier which could be tapped at short notice (Paragraph 6.4.3).
e. Revive the PPP Cells supported by the DEA over the last
decade in Infrastructure Ministries and State Governments (Paragraph 6.1.5).
f. An institutionalized mechanism like the National
Facilitation Committee (NFC) to ensure time bound resolution of issues
including getting timely clearances/approvals during implementation of projects
for smooth running of such projects (Paragraph 6.2.5).
g. Ministry of Finance to coordinate with other implementing
ministries may develop a policy to promote secondary market for operational assets
(Paragraph 6.1.9).
h. Disallow statutory audit to books of SPVs governed by the
provisions of the Companies Act. Ensure adoption of principles of good
governance by the SPVs (Paragraph 6.2.3). 5) Generic, Including Legacy Projects
6. Chapter 6- Strengthening Policy, Governance and Institutional Capacity
Report of the Committee on Revisiting and Revitalising the PPP Model of
Infrastructure xvi
i. Standard public authority requirements of audit till
point of award (public books) and post-construction discharge by Authority of
monitoring and oversight of project operations as per the concession agreement
(public books) to be in the purview of statutory/government audit agencies
(Paragraph 6.2.3).
j. Essential to set up independent Regulators in sectors
going in for PPP (Paragraph 6.1.8).
k. Discourage government participation in SPVs that
implement PPP projects unless strategically essential.
7. Scaling- Up Finance
a. Restrict the number of banks in a consortium (Paragraph
7.2.3).
b. Banks to build up their own risk assessment/appraisal
capabilities (Paragraph 7.2.3).
c. Check list of items listed as a guidance for lenders.
d. RBI may provide guidelines to lenders on encashment of
bank guarantees in line with ICC norms (Paragraph 7.1.3).
e. Monetisation of viable projects that have stable revenue
flows after EPC delivery should be considered (Paragraph 7.1.8).
f. Equity in completed, successful infrastructure projects
may be divested by offering to long-term investors.
g. Ministry of Finance to allow banks and financial
institutions to issue Zero Coupon Bonds which will also help to achieve soft
landing for user charges in infrastructure sector (Paragraph 7.1.5).
8. Revitalising Contractual Processes
a) Need for review of the MCAs (Paragraph 8.1.1).
b) Sample suggestions for generic changes, including for
resolution of disputes, and sector-specific changes (Paragraph 8.1.4 and 8.2.1)
9. Reinvigorating the Sectors:
a. Independent sector regulators essential (Paragraph
9.2.5).
b. Build upon maturing landscape in Roads and Ports PPP and
move into the next phase: Roads: avoiding delays, institutionalized dispute
resolution, improved project development activity, monetization of operational
assets, efficiency and transparency by electronic tolling, etc (Paragraph
9.3.6).
c. Ports: review of role and need of Tariff Authority for
Major Ports (TAMP), review of MCA, quicker clearances, rationalized leases and
stamp duties (Paragraphs 9.3.1-9.3.5).
d. Airport: PPPs to be encouraged where viable in Greenfield
and brownfield projects, have policy that addresses potential demand for
airport services in the country, notify a unified regulatory structure, clarity
in delineation of Till policy,
e. Encourage use of PPPs in sectors like Railways, Urban,
etc. Railways to have an independent tariff regulator, tap potentially useful
PPP opportunities including brownfield assets (Paragraph 9.5.1-9.5.4).
10 .Fast Forward PPPs
a. Set up an institute of excellence in PPP to inter alia
guide the sector, provide policy input, timely advice and undertake sustainable
capacity building (Paragraph 10.1.3).
b. Ensure integrated development of infrastructure with
roadmaps for delivery of projects (Paragraph 10.1.5).
c. India’s demographic deadlines are staring at us. There
are only two or three decades left to complete the transition from a country
that has just attained middle-income status to that of a high-income and
developed economy. Besides the basic problems for provision of adequate
infrastructure, the middle-income trap is also to be averted. Without adequate
infrastructure, this will simply not be possible. India is currently in a
global win-win situation with a large young population that will need good jobs
and a huge pool of global savings that can be tapped for building out our
infrastructure. PPPs are an important policy instrument that will enable India
to compress time in this journey towards economic growth and development. A
successful and growing stream of PPPs in infrastructure will go a long way in
accelerating the country’s development process (Paragraph 10.2.1)
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DSM/MAM