Excerpts from Prime Minister’s Reply to Discussion in Rajya Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States on 17.8.2006
.At the outset, I would like
to convey my gratitude to all the Hon’ble Members who have participated in
this debate. I am grateful for this
opportunity to clarify some of the issues arising from the discussion. I will
do so in a non partisan spirit and I have every reason to believe that after
I have finished that I will be able to carry the whole House with me. Our Government has never shied away from a
full discussion in Parliament on this important issue. On three previous occasions on July 29, 2005,
February 27, 2006 and March 7, 2006, I had made detailed statements and discussed
this important subject in this august House.
Once again, several issues have been raised during the current discussions
and I wish to take this opportunity to respond to them. I also intend to cover developments since my
last Suo Motu statement of March 7 this year.
2. Two
types of comments have been made during the discussion in the House. The first set of issues pertains to the basic
orientation of our foreign policy. Some
Hon’ble Members have observed that by engaging in discussions with, and allegedly
acquiescing in the demands made by the United States, we have compromised
the independent nature of our foreign policy.
3. The second set of issues pertain to deviations from the
July 18 Joint Statement and the March 2 Separation Plan. Many of the points raised by the Hon’ble Members
have also been aired outside Parliament, notably also by some senior members
of the scientific establishment. Overall,
a listing of the important concerns include the following: that the India-US Nuclear initiative and more
particularly the content of the proposed legislation in the US Congress, could
undermine the autonomy of our decision-making; limit the options or compromise
the integrity of our strategic programme; and adversely affect the future
of our scientific research and development. To sum up, this would suggest that India’s strategic nuclear autonomy
is being compromised and India is allowing itself to be pressurized into accepting
new and unacceptable conditions that are deviations from the commitments made
by me to Parliament in July 2005 and in February and March this year.
4. I recognize that many of these concerns are borne out of
genuine conviction that nothing should be done that would undermine long standing
policies that have a bearing on India’s vital national security interests.
I fully share and subscribe to these sentiments.
I would like to assure the Hon’ble Members that negotiations with the
US regarding the civilian nuclear deal have not led to any change in the basic
orientation of our policies, or affected our independent judgment of issues
of national interest. Last year during my visit to the US, I addressed the
National Press Club in the full glare of the media. A question was put to
me regarding what I thought about the US intervention in Iraq. In the full
public glare of the media I said that it was a mistake. I said the same to
President Bush when he visited India. I said India does not find favour with
regime change.
5. The thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion
of our national interest. We are unswerving
in our commitment to an independent foreign policy. We do recognize the complexities present in an increasingly inter-dependent
and multi-polar world. While we recognize
that the United States is a pre-eminent power and good relations with the
U.S. are in our national interest, this has not in any way clouded our judgment.
There are many areas of agreement with the United States, but at the
same time there are a number of areas in which we have differences and we
have not shied away from making these known to the US, as also expressing
them in public. Currently, we are engaged not only with the
US but other global powers like Russia, China, the EU, UK, France and Japan.
We are also focusing on ASEAN, as well as countries in West Asia, Africa
and Latin America. More importantly, we are devoting proportionately
larger time and effort in building relations with countries in our immediate
neighbourhood like Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Our relations with all these countries are determined by the dictates
of our enlightened national interest and we have not allowed any other country,
including the United States, to influence our polices. This will not change
as long as I am Prime Minister.
6. I would, hence, again reiterate in view of the apprehensions
expressed, that the proposed US legislation on nuclear cooperation with India
will not be allowed to become an instrument to compromise India’s sovereignty.
Our foreign policy is determined solely by our national interests. No legislation enacted in a foreign country
can take away from us that sovereign right.
Thus there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a
foreign legislature. Our sole guiding principle in regard to our foreign
policy, whether it is on Iran or any other country, will be dictated entirely
by our national interest.
7. Let me now turn to some of the concerns that have been
expressed on the second set of issues regarding possible deviations from assurances
given by me in this august House on the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and
the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. I would like to state categorically that there have neither been
nor will there be any compromises on this score and the Government will not
allow such compromises to occur in the future.
8. Hon’ble Members will recall that during President Bush’s
visit to India in March this year, agreement was reached between India and
the United States on a Separation Plan in implementation of the India-United
States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005.
This Separation Plan had identified the nuclear facilities that India
was willing to offer, in a phased manner, for IAEA safeguards, contingent
on reciprocal actions taken by the United States.
For its part, the United States Administration was required to approach
the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group for
adapting its Guidelines to enable full civilian nuclear cooperation between
India and the international community.
9. The US Administration had thereafter approached the US
Congress to amend certain provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, which currently prohibit civil nuclear cooperation with India. The US House of Representatives International
Relations Committee passed a Bill on the subject on 27th June 2006.
The House of Representatives passed the Bill as approved by its International
Relations Committee on July 27.
10. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
passed its version of the Bill on June 29, 2006. The US Senate is now expected to vote on this
version of the Bill some time in September. We have concerns over both the House and Senate versions of the
Bill. Since the two Bills are somewhat different in content, according to
US practice they will need to be reconciled to produce a single piece of legislation.
After adoption by both the House and the Senate, this would become
law when the US President accords his approval.
The final shape of the legislation would, therefore, be apparent only
when the House and the Senate complete the second stage of assent/adoption.
11. Meanwhile, the US Government has
approached the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to adapt its guidelines to enable
full civil nuclear cooperation between India and the International community. In March this year, the NSG at its plenary
meeting in Brazil held a preliminary discussion on this issue. The matter will be further discussed by the
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group later this year.
On our part, we have separately raised this issue with several countries
and urged them to lift the existing restrictions on nuclear supplies to India.
I myself have raised this issue with the Heads of State or Government
of Russia, France, UK, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Norway, Iceland and Cyprus,
among others.
12. In view of the concerns voiced by the
Hon’ble Members, I shall try to address each of these concerns in some detail.
I shall, however, begin by affirming that our approach is guided by
the understandings contained in the July 2005 Joint Statement and the March
2006 Separation Plan. What we can agree with the United States to
enable nuclear cooperation must be strictly within these parameters.
13. The
key provisions to which references have been made in Parliament and outside
are the following:
(i) Full Civil Nuclear Cooperation
: The central imperative in
our discussions with the United State on Civil Nuclear Cooperation is to ensure
the complete and irreversible removal of existing restrictions imposed on
India through iniquitous restrictive trading regimes over the years.
We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and
technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy ‑ ranging
from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing spent fuel, i.e. all
aspects of a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
This
will be the surest guarantee of India’s acceptance as a full and equal partner
of the international nuclear community, even while preserving the integrity
of our three stage nuclear programme and protecting the autonomy of our scientific
research and development. We will
not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits
of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above.
(ii) Principle of Reciprocity
: I had earlier assured
the House that reciprocity is the key to the implementation of our
understanding contained in the July 2005 Statement. I stand by that commitment. When
we put forward the Separation Plan, we again made it clear to the United States
that India could not be expected to take on obligations such as placing its
nuclear facilities under safeguards in anticipation of future lifting of restrictions.
India and the United States have held one round of discussions on a
proposed bilateral cooperation agreement. India and the IAEA have held technical
discussions regarding an India-specific Safeguards agreement.
Further discussions are required on both these documents. While these parallel efforts are underway,
our position is that we will accept only IAEA safeguards on the nuclear facilities,
in a phased manner, and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan
only when all nuclear restrictions on India have been lifted.
On July 29 last year, I had stated that before voluntarily placing
our civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure that all
restrictions on India have been lifted. There has been no shift in our position
on this point.
(iii) Certification
: The draft Senate Bill requires the US President to make an annual report
to the Congress that includes certification that India is in full compliance
of its non‑proliferation and other commitments. We have made it clear to the United States our opposition to these
provisions, even if they are projected as non‑binding on India, as being
contrary to the letter and spirit of the July Statement. We have told the US Administration that the
effect of such certification will be to diminish a permanent waiver authority
into an annual one. We have also indicated that this would introduce an element
of uncertainty regarding future cooperation and is, not acceptable to us.
(iv) India as a State
possessing Advanced Nuclear Technology : Hon’ble Members may recall
that the July Statement, had acknowledged that India should be regarded as
a State with advanced nuclear technology enjoying the same advantages and
benefits as other states with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US.
The July Statement did not refer to India as a Nuclear Weapons State because
that has a particular connotation in the NPT but it explicitly acknowledged
the existence of India’s military nuclear facilities. It also meant that India
would not attract full‑scope safeguards such as those applied to Non‑Nuclear
Weapon States that are signatories to the NPT and there would be no curbs
on continuation of India’s nuclear weapon related activities. In these important
respects, India would be very much on par with the five Nuclear Weapon States
who are signatories to the NPT. Similarly, the Separation Plan provided for
an India‑specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA with assurances
of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors together with India’s right to
take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. We have
made clear to the US that India’s strategic programme is totally outside the
purview of the July Statement, and we oppose any legislative provisions that
Mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities.
(v) Safeguards Agreement
and Fuel Assurances : In this respect too, it is worth emphasizing
that the March 2006 Separation Plan provides for an India‑Specific Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to
reactors that would be placed under IAEA safeguards together with India’s
right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted.
We, of course, have the sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to
fully safeguard our interests. An
important assurance is the commitment of support for India’s right to build
up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of India’s reactors.
We have initiated technical discussions at the expert level with the
IAEA on an India‑Specific Safeguards Agreement. Both the Bilateral Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement with the United States and the India-Specific Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA would be only within the parameters of the July Statement
and the March Separation Plan. There is no question of India signing either
a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a type concluded
by Non‑Nuclear Weapons States who have signed the NPT. We will not accept
any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond
those contained in an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Therefore
there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear
facilities.
(vi) Integrity and
reliability of our strategic programme – autonomy of decision-making
and future scientific research and development: In my statement of March 7, 2006, I had assured
Parliament that the Separation Plan would not adversely affect our strategic
programme. I reiterate that commitment today. The Separation Plan has been
so designed as to ensure adequacy of fissile material and other inputs for
our strategic programme, based on our current and assessed future needs. The
integrity of our 3‑Stage nuclear programme will not be affected. The
autonomy of our Research and Development activity, including development of
our fast breeder reactors and the thorium programme, in the nuclear field
will remain unaffected. We will not accept interference by other countries
vis-à-vis the development of our strategic programme. We will not allow external
scrutiny of our strategic programme in any manner, much less allow it to be
a condition for future nuclear cooperation between India and the international
community.
(vii) Moratorium on
production of fissile material: Our position on this matter is unambiguous.
We are not willing to accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material.
We are only committed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a commitment which was given by the previous
government. India is willing to join
only a non‑discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally
verifiable FMCT, as and when it is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament,
again provided our security interests are fully addressed.
(viii) Non‑discriminatory
Global Nuclear Disarmament: Our commitment towards non-discriminatory
global nuclear disarmament remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi
Action Plan. There is no dilution on this count. We do not accept proposals
put forward from time to time for regional non‑proliferation or regional
disarmament. Pending global nuclear disarmament, there is no question of India
joining the NPT as a non‑nuclear weapon state, or accepting full‑scope
safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supplies to India, now or in the future.
(ix) Cessation of Future
Cooperation : There is provision in the proposed US law that were
India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to
cease further cooperation. Our position on this is unambiguous. The US has
been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the India-US Bilateral
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation is not
acceptable to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary
moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July Statement. The same
is true of other intrusive non‑proliferation benchmarks that are mentioned
in the proposed US legislation. India’s possession and development of nuclear
weapons is an integral part of our national security. This will remain so.
14. Hon’ble
Members will appreciate the fact that an international negotiation on nuclear
energy cooperation particularly when it involves dismantling restrictive regimes
that have lasted for over three decades is a complex and sensitive exercise.
What we are attempting today is to put in place new international arrangements
that would overturn three decades of iniquitous restrictions. It is inevitable,
therefore, that there would be some contradictory pulls and pressures. This
does not mean that India will succumb to pressures or accept conditionalities
that are contrary to its national interests.
15. I
had personally spoken to President Bush in St. Petersburg last month on this
issue, and conveyed to him that the proposed US legislation must conform strictly
to the parameters of the July 18, 2005 Statement and the March 2, 2006
Separation Plan. This alone would be an acceptable basis for nuclear cooperation
between India and the United States. India cannot, and is not prepared to,
take on additional commitments outside this agreed framework or allow any
extraneous issues to be introduced. I have received an assurance from the
US President that it was not his intention to shift goalposts, and that the
parameters of the scope of cooperation would be those contained in the July
2005 Joint Statement and the March 2006 Separation Plan. A White House Statement
of Administration Policy of July 26, 2006 recognizes some, though not all,
of India’s concerns, and conveyed that the Administration has voiced them
with the Congress.
16. I
can assure you that there is no ambiguity in our position in so far as it
has been conveyed to the US. The US is aware of our position that the only
way forward is strict adherence to July Statement and March Separation Plan.
I am hopeful that the bilateral India‑US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
when concluded will take into account the issues raised here. However, I must
be honest and frank that I cannot predict with certainty the final form of
the US legislation or the outcome of this process with the NSG, which consists
of 45 countries with divergent views. We
are hopeful that this will lead in a direction wherein our interests are fully
protected and that there is a complete lifting of restrictions on India that
have existed for three decades. Such an outcome if it materializes will contribute
to our long‑term energy security by enabling a rapid increase in nuclear
power. It would lead to the dismantling of the technology denial regimes that
have hampered our development particularly in hi‑tech sectors.
I will have wide consultations including with the members of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the nuclear and scientific communities and others to develop
a broad based national consensus on this important matter. I wish to inform
members of the House that I have invited members of the Atomic Energy Commission
on the 26th August for a meeting. That same day I have also invited
the group of distinguished scientists who have expressed concerns to meet
me.
17. Finally,
I would only like to state that in keeping with our commitments to Parliament
and the nation, we will not accept any conditions that go beyond the parameters
of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation
Plan, agreed to between India and the United States. If in their final form
the US legislation or the adapted NSG Guidelines impose extraneous conditions
on India, the Government will draw the necessary conclusions, consistent with
the commitments I have made to Parliament.
[Prime Minister also gave the following responses
to points raised by the Left parties ]
1.
Whether the deal will give “full” civilian nuclear technology and lift
all existing sanctions on dual use technology imposed on India for not signing
the NPT.
Response:
The
objective of full civil nuclear cooperation is enshrined in the July Statement.
This objective can be realized when current restrictions on nuclear
trade with India are fully lifted. In
accordance with the July Statement, US has initiated steps to amend its legislation
and to approach the NSG to adapt its guidelines. We seek the removal of restrictions
on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil
nuclear energy – ranging from supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, reprocessing
spent fuel, i.e., all aspects of complete nuclear fuel supply. Only such cooperation would be in keeping with the July Joint Statement.
2. Cannot
accept restrictions on Indian foreign policy to be imposed such as on Iran,
irrespective of whether it is in the policy section or in the sense of the
House section of the legislation.
Response:
Government
is clear that our commitments are only those that are contained in the July
Joint Statement and in the Separation Plan.
We cannot accept introduction of extraneous issues on foreign policy. Any prescriptive suggestions in this regard
are not acceptable to us.
Our foreign policy is and will be solely determined by our national interests.
No legislation enacted in a foreign country can take away from us this
sovereign right.
3.
Signing of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for the civilian programme
to take place after the US Congress had approved a “123 Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement”. All restrictions on India to be lifted before
we sign the IAEA safeguards.
Response: I had conveyed to
Parliament on July 29, 2005 on my return from Washington that before placing
any of our nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure all restrictions
on India have been lifted. Under the
Separation Plan agreed to with the United States, India has offered to place
under IAEA safeguards 14 of its reactors presently operating or under constructions
between 2006 and 2014. The nuclear
facilities listed in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards only
after all nuclear restrictions have been lifted on India. This would include suitable amendments to the
US legislation to allow for such cooperation, the passing of the bilateral
agreement with India and the adaption of the NSG guidelines. It is clear that India cannot be expected to
take safeguards obligations on its nuclear facilities in anticipation of future
lifting of restrictions.
4.
Guarantees on fuel as agreed in the March 2006 statement.
In case the US reneges on supply of fuel, they will ensure continuity through
other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Response:
Separation
Plan includes elaborate fuel supply assurances given by the United States. Understandings in the Separation Plan also
provide for contingency of disruption of fuel supplies to India. In such a case, the United States and India
would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries (Russia, France
and United Kingdom) aimed at restoring fuel supplies to India. An important
assurance is the commitment of support for India’s right to build strategic
reserves of fuel over the life time of its nuclear reactors. In the event of disruption of fuel supplies
despite the assurances, India will have a right to take corrective measure
to ensure the operation of its nuclear reactors.
5. India
will work for an FMCT and for nuclear disarmament with all nuclear weapon
states, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Plan or Delhi Declaration in tandem.
Response:
Our
support for global nuclear disarmament remains unwaivering. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had put forward
an Action Plan in the 1988 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. We remain committed to the central goal of
this Action Plan, i.e., complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to
global nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework. India has agreed to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. There has been no change
in our position on this matter.
6. In
the original deal, there is no provision for US inspectors, only provision
for IAEA inspectors. The draft US
Bills contains such provisions.
Response: In the Separation Plan, we have agreed
to offer for IAEA safeguards nuclear facilities specified in the Separation
Plan for that purpose. The nature
of safeguards will be determined by an India specific safeguards agreement
with the IAEA. This will be applied
to the safeguarded nuclear facilities in India.
Therefore, there is no question of accepting other verification measures
or third country inspectors to visit our nuclear facilities, outside the framework
of the India specific safeguards agreement.
7. An
India-specific protocol and not an Additional Protocol as per IAEA Standard
Modified Protocol.
Response:
In
the Separation Plan, we have agreed to conclude an India specific safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. The question
of an Additional Protocol will arise only after the India specific safeguards
agreement is in place. As a country
with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a Safeguards
agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapon states
of the NPT.
8.
References to Iran in the House Bill.
Response:
We
reject the linkage of any extraneous issue to the nuclear understanding. India’s foreign policy will be decided on the
basis
of Indian national interests only.
9.
Reference to Proliferation Security Initiative in the House and Senate
Bills.
Response:
The
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an extraneous issue as it is outside
the framework of the July 18 Joint Statement.
Therefore, we cannot accept it as a condition for implementing the
July Statement. Separately, the Government
has examined the PSI.
We have certain concerns regarding its legal implications and its linkages
with the NPT. We also have concerns
with amendments to the suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea Treaty under
the International Maritime Organisation.
10. The Jackson-Vanik
Amendment linking the granting of MFN status to USSR to Jewish emigration
is an example relevant to the current debate.
Response: We
have studied the proposed US legislation very carefully, including the so-called
binding and non-binding provisions. The
non-binding provisions do not require mandatory action, but at the same time,
have a certain weight in the implementation of the legislation as a whole.
We have conveyed our concerns to the US Administration in this respect.
Jackson-Vanik Amendment was binding on the Administration and cannot
be cited as a precedent for non-binding references in the current bills. A
more accurate example than the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is the set of provisions
accompanying the renewal of MFN status to China, that included references
to China’s human rights, China’s political and religious prisoners, protection
of Tibetan heritage and freedom of political expression.
11. Role of Parliament
in approving foreign policy.
Response: India
follows a Parliamentary model, as specified in our Constitution, wherein treaty
making powers rest with the Executive. However, we have kept Parliament fully
in the picture regarding various stages of our negotiations with the United
States. Broad based domestic consensus
cutting across all sections in Parliament and outside will be necessary. We will work towards that objective by addressing
various concerns as fully as possible.
[Prime Minister also gave the following responses
to points raised by the group of nuclear scientists]
1. “India
should continue to be able to hold on to her nuclear option as a strategic
requirement in the real world that that we live in, and in the ever-changing
complexity of the international political system.
This means that we cannot accede to any restraint in perpetuity on
our freedom of action. We have not
done this for the last 40 years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into
being, and there is no reason why we should succumb to this now. Universal nuclear disarmament must be our ultimate
aim, and until we see the light at the end of the tunnel on this important
issue, we cannot accept any agreement in perpetuity.”
Response: We are very firm in our determination
that agreement with United States on Civil Nuclear Energy in no way affects
the requirements of our strategic programme.
We are fully conscious of the changing complexity of the international
political system. Nuclear weapons
are an integral part of our national security and will remain so, pending
the global elimination of all nuclear weapons and universal non-discriminatory
nuclear disarmament. Our freedom of
action with regard to our strategic programmes remains unrestricted. The nuclear agreement will not be allowed to
be used as a backdoor method of introducing NPT type restrictions on India.
Our offer to put nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity
is conditional upon these facilities securing fuel from international sources
for their life time. If the fuel supply assurances as enumerated in Separation Plan are
disrupted, then India will have the right to take corrective measures to ensure
the continued operation of these reactors.
2. ‘After
1974, when the major powers discontinued cooperation with us, we have built
up our capability in many sensitive technological areas, which need not and
should not now be subjected to external control.
Safeguards are understandable where external assistance for nuclear
materials or technologies are involved. We
have agreed to this before, and we can continue to agree to this in the future
too, but strictly restricted to those facilities and materials imported from
external sources.’
Response:
Sensitive
nuclear technology facilities have not been covered in the Separation Plan.
Therefore, there is no question of putting them under safeguards or
under external controls. Even with regard to nuclear facilities that
have been included in Separation Plan, safeguards will be applied in phases
between 2006 and 2014. These safeguarded
facilities will be eligible for and will receive fuel materials and technology
from international sources. If such supplies cease, then India will be free
to protect its interests through corrective measures. That will be spelt out clearly in the India specific safeguards
agreement.
3. ‘We
find that the Indo-US deal, in the form approved by the US House of Representatives,
infringes on our Independence for carrying out indigenous research and development
in nuclear science and technology. Our R&D should not be hampered by external
supervision or control, or by the need to satisfy any international body.
Research and technology development are the Sovereign rights of any nation.
This is especially true when they concern strategic national defence
and energy self-sufficiency.’
Response: Our independence for carrying
out independent research and development in nuclear science and technology
will remain unaffected. There will
be no external supervision of our R&D since none of the sensitive R&D
facilities which handle nuclear material have been included in the Separation
Plan. Nothing in the Separation Plan infringes on our sovereign right to conduct
research and technology development concerning our national defence and energy
self-sufficiency. Government is committed
to preserve the integrity of the three stage nuclear power programme, including
utilization of our vast thorium resources. Certain nuclear facilities including centers such as TIFR, Variable
Energy Cyclotron Centre, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics etc., have been
designated as civilian in the Separation Plan. As these facilities will not handle nuclear material, there is no
question of safeguards being applied to them.
We expect these centers to participate as full partners in international
collaboration project.
4. ‘While
the sequence of actions to implement the cooperation could be left for discussion
between the two governments, the basic principles on which such actions will
rest is the right of Parliament and the people to decide. The Prime Minister has already taken up with
President George Bush the issue of the new clauses recommended by the US House
of Representatives. If the US Congress,
in its wisdom, passes the bill in its present form, the ‘product’ will become
unacceptable to India, and diplomatically, it will be very difficult to change
it later. Hence, it is important for
our Parliament to work out, and insist on, the ground rules for the nuclear
deal, at this stage itself.’
Response: I
had taken up with President Bush our concerns regarding provisions in the two
bills. It is clear that if the final
product is in its current form, India will have grave difficulties in accepting
the bills. US has been left in no doubt
as to our position. The ground rules
for our discussions are clear. These
are the parameters of the July Statement and the March Separation Plan and
commitments given by me to Parliament in the three Suo Moto Statements and my
reply to today’s discussions will be the guiding principles of our
position. Parliament has been kept
fully informed at every stage of the discussions. In their final form, if US legislation or the NSG guidelines impose
extraneous conditions on India, the Government will draw the necessary conclusions
consistent with my commitments to Parliament.
(Release ID :19938)