Following is the text of the address
of Vice President of India Mohd. Hamid Ansari at ‘Haksar Memorial Lecture’
at Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial
Development, Chandigarh today :
“ The task
is daunting, the capability questionable. To be called upon to deliver the P.N.
Haksar Memorial Lecture would be a great honour at any time; it is to me particularly
because I belong to a generation of Indians who witnessed Haksar saheb’s work
in two phases of his life – of action and of introspection. Neither of these,
let me add, was totally exclusive. By the time of his death in 1998, some of the
major premises of his belief system – democracy, secularism, socialism, nonalignment
– had come under pressure and were the cause of disillusionment.
In an editorial
in Man and Development many years back, Haksar spoke of the need ‘to hold
aloft the banner of the moral universe’ and opined that ‘human passions’ and ‘permanent
values’ play a role in history. Elsewhere, he expressed surprise over the ‘symptoms
of of utter confusion in its value system’ displayed by the Indian society in
a period of change. ‘Preserving the moral health of body politic and maintaining
the ecological balance’, he wrote, ‘are conditions precedent to survival and growth
not only of India, but of this entire earth’.
It is my
purpose today to probe these concepts and Indian responses to them
A great
revolutionary of the twentieth century, Leon Trotsky, described the role of sentiment
in critical moments in human history. ‘The masses’, he wrote in his monumental
History of the Russian Revolution ‘go into a revolution not with a prepared
plan of social reconstruction, but with a sharp feeling that they cannot endure
the old regime’. He pointed to the difficulties encountered in studying ‘the changes
in mass consciousness in a revolutionary epoch’.
How then
do we define the moral universe and the role of passion in it? The challenge for
India, said Haksar, is ‘to use its material, intellectual, cultural and philosophical
resources to regenerate itself into a truly free, just and humane society, and
simultaneously to strive for a similar world society. The two are different aspects
of the same objective, for a humane and peaceable India is not possible if it
lives in an aggressive world atmosphere’.
The operative
words are free, just, and humane. They relate to the domestic and the global
scene. India became free in 1947 and gave itself a Constitution in 1950 that spelt
out the dimensions of justice. It is to be social, economic and political. The
sequence is not alphabetical and its logic is not difficult to comprehend. Distributive
justice is writ large and has been so understood. It connotes the removal of injustice
resulting from transactions between un-equals in society.
The law
does not define ‘humane’ or humaneness. Its dictionary meaning – benevolent or
compassionate – is in the realm of morality, ethics and philosophy. What is not
defined in law is amplified in common usage. In America, a humane society is defined
as ‘as a group that aims to stop animal suffering due to cruelty or other reasons;
in fact, an American Humane Association for Protecting Children and Animals came
into existence in 1877. From this, one could, in Socratic reasoning, perhaps argue
on the one hand that humaneness could include prevention of cruelty to humans
as a whole and, on the other, draw attention to the unavoidable link between humaneness
and justice. On this logic, therefore, a just society has to be a caring society.
Other questions
need to be considered before proceeding further. Is there a linkage between the
social realm and the moral one? Is it possible to structure relationships on a
political basis? Have societies existed that have defined their structures
and relationships principally or exclusively on functional terms devoid of a value
judgment? What has been the ambit of such societies in terms of inclusion and
exclusion?
The debate
goes back a long way in history. In Mahabharata the sage Vamadeva stresses
the need to act righteously: ‘ There is nothing superior to righteousness. Those
kings that are observant of righteousness succeed...That king who disregards righteousness
and desires to act with brute force, soon falls away from righteousness and loses
both Righteousness and Profit’.
The pervasiveness
of the concept is evident in all periods and in all societies. Rousseau aptly
posed the perennial question: ‘I wish to enquire whether, taking men as they are
and laws as they can be made, it is possible establish some just and certain rule
of administration in civil affairs’.
This is
evident in our own times in Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings and in Ambedkar’s definition
of Dharma as ‘righteousness, which means right relations between man and
man in all spheres of life’ and is, of necessity, social. It is also the essence
of morality.
The Raj
Ghat at New Delhi is visited reverentially by the public, ritually by public figures
and out of curiosity by tourists. A little away from the Samadhi is a stone tablet
with the inscription: Seven Social Sins. These are listed on the tablet:
·
Politics without principle
·
Pleasure without conscience
·
Wealth without work
·
Knowledge without character
·
Commerce without morality
·
Science without humanity
·
Worship without sacrifice
Each of
these is a statement of principle that can be comprehended, interpreted and implemented,
individually and collectively. On my part, I would like to discern a pattern in
the last words of each dictum: principle, conscience, work, character, morality,
humanity and sacrifice. A similar pattern, summing up different forms
of human activity, is discernable when the first words of the statements are put
together.
In the
Gandhian approach, therefore, conscience is motivated by considerations of humanity
and sacrifice to develop a moral character that holds aloft in its work the banner
of a principled approach. The reverse of it would be selfishness inducing an unprincipled,
opportunistic, approach to work. The latter would produce neither justice nor
humaneness. On this thesis, the choice would be clear if the human being is a
moral creature having a sense of right and wrong in his individual and group conduct.
Here we
are confronted by a set of questions. Can the principles of public morality be
different from those of private morality? Can a society have one set of ethical
norms for governing conduct of public institutions and another set of norms for
citizens in their individual capacities? Do these norms govern the conduct of
the highest form of public institution – the State (a) in relation to its citizens
and (b) in inter-state relations? In other words, is the State required to observe
norms of behaviour in its functioning
For purposes
of our discussion, therefore, we end up with four possible categories of conduct
norms: for individuals, institutions, the State within its domestic jurisdiction,
and the State in its dealings with other states. This raises a fundamental question:
Is such categorisation desirable? Can virtue and righteousness be imbibed selectively?
Is it not desirable to have a unified theory of morality?
The Gandhian,
and the ethical, approach would be to insist both on a unified theory and on practice
in consonance with it. In actual practice, however, selectivity is the norm. This
approach concedes the desirability of morality in personal life but finds reasons
for departing from it in public life. The proponents of this approach make a beginning
with inter-state relations in the comity of nations. An English statesman made
the classic statement on this subject in late nineteenth century. ‘I am a great
believer’, he said, ‘in morality, public and private; you must however concede
that the conduct of nations cannot be governed by it’. He did not add but undoubtedly
implied that the State was above moral norms in its external dealings.
The argument
had a limited time span. State misbehaviour contributed to it in good measure.
The end of World War I saw the beginning of systematic efforts to circumscribe
the unchecked conduct of states. World War II gave it an impetus and led to the
Charter of the United Nations. International covenants in the past seven decades
have put paid to the doctrine of absolute sovereignty and to the unchecked behaviour
of states. Practice, of course, lags behind but is not sought to be justified
in principle.
A parallel
evolution was witnessed in regard to the behaviour of the State within its domestic
jurisdiction. The principle of rule of law, and of responsible and responsive
governance, is no longer disputed and is being implemented in increasing measure.
Before we delve into the particular domain of the current situation of our society
and polity, I wish to briefly examine the instrumentalities that societal and
political evolution has bestowed upon us for dispelling the darkness of moral
ambiguity of states – the moral torchlights of our era. These are: 1. A globalising
Civil Society; 2. Fundamental and Universal Human Rights; and 3. A global movement
for enhanced transparency in the functioning of state actors.
We have
seen periods in history where States have applied different standards or moral
criteria (a) in their domestic jurisdiction, and (b) while dealing with States
and peoples whom they consider as not deserving of equal treatment.
Yet, the
horizon is not all dark. In our country,
our region and beyond we witness active civil society movements that have supported
common peoples and have sought to bring back State behaviour to the moral realm.
Advancement in communication and transportation has facilitated the process
of globalization of this civil society movement. This development has been critical
in emphasising the primacy of fundamental and universal human rights, not only
as a basic norm of State behaviour but also in the behaviour of individuals towards
each other. Human rights, in varying degrees, have been internalised voluntarily
or on account of external pressures.
The drive
for greater transparency in State behaviour was intended to make State actors
accountable. In our own country, the ‘Right
to Information’ movement has had significant success and is seen globally as a
pioneering effort. Good governance and transparency are being recognised as imperatives
in corporate institutions and will be increasingly so in the future.
It is undisputed
today that a free, just and humane society is one that respects fundamental
human rights not only of its citizens but of all peoples, has a State structure
that is transparent in its functioning and encourages the growth of a healthy
civil society.
Step by
step, therefore, the circle for unprincipled, immoral and amoral behaviour is
being narrowed down to individual behaviour. The challenge lies in addressing
it because individuals are the building blocks of societies. They are also the
principal actors in political life of societies and determine its character by
their principles and conduct.
A transition
from the general to the particular is essential to carry the argument forward.
The Indian society of today, despite its moorings in religion and tradition, is
increasingly prone to be amoral in the behaviour of its individual and group components.
A good instance is the case of corruption in public life.
Political
corruption is defined as the misuse of public office for private gain. Mahatma
Gandhi’s outburst in 1939 is indicative of its presence even in the period before
Independence.
In 1949
the Urdu poet Josh Malihabadi, in a poem entitled Rishwat, gave vent to public’s
perception of the prevalent bribery. A quatrain portrays its extent:
Log ham se roz kahte
hain yeh aadat chore ye
Yeh tejarat hai khelaaf-e-aadmiyat
chore ye
Is se bad tar lat
nehain hai koye, yeh lat chore ye
Roz akhbaroan
main chapta hai ki rishwat chore ye
A couplet,
towards the end of the poem, was cynically expressive of disgust:
Illat-e rishwat
ko is dunya se rukhsat keej ye
War na
rishwat ki dharalle se ijazt deej ye
In 1951
the A.D. Gorwala Report made specific observations on this count. In 1964 the
Santhanam Committee noted the ‘widespread impression that failure of integrity
is not uncommon among ministers and that some ministers, who have held office
during the last sixteen years, have enriched themselves illegitimately’. It also
talked of nepotism and ‘other advantages inconsistent with any notion of purity
in public life’. More recently, the published portions of the N.N. Vohra Report
of 1995 spoke of ‘the nexus between criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians
has come out clearly in various parts of the country. The existing criminal justice
system, which was essentially designed to deal with individual offences/crimes,
is unable to deal with the activities of the Mafia; the provisions of the law
in regard to economic offences are weak’.
An observation
by a former Chief Justice of India, in 1997, is telling. ‘The element of deterrence’,
he noted, ‘is almost non-existent. The public perception is that the machinery
for enforcement of accountability is itself controlled by those whose accountability
needs to be enforced. All institutions of law enforcement lack accountability,
the difference between them is only in the degree of culpability’. He pleaded
for ‘concerted efforts for infusion of ethics in public life’.
An official
acknowledgement of the problem of corruption came from Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh in August 2004. Addressing a conference of state CBI and Anti-corruption
Bureau officials, he said:
‘The problem
of corruption in public life is a source of great concern for all those who are
interested in building a new India, an inclusive society, progressive society
and a dynamic economy and a compassionate polity. In my Independence Day Address,
I said that while the question of ethics in public life has repeatedly agitated
our people, we have tried over a period of time, to find constitutional, legislative
and administrative devices to deal with the challenge posed by growth of corruption
to our body politic. I said in my address that the time has come for us to evolve
consensually a code of conduct for all political parties, a code of ethics for
all individuals in public life, and a code of best practices for the Government
at all levels.’
This statement,
from the highest levels of Government, is indicative of the seriousness of the
problem. It can be supplemented, in ample measure, by civil society perceptions.
The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, based on public
opinion and business community surveys, gave India in 2007 the score of 3.5 on
a scale of 10 (highly clean). The corresponding figures for the preceding years
were 3.3, 2.9, and 2.8. India was ranked 72 in a list of 179 countries.
This state
of affairs has implications that are wide-ranging and multi-dimensional. The challenge
is to comprehend, and confront, the question in its totality. Corruption is as
much moral as a development issue. It tends to distort the decision-making processes
on investment projects and other commercial transactions. It impacts at the foundations
of the social and political fabric of society. It increases injustice and disregard
for the rule of law. As such, it is to be viewed as a symptom of fundamental weaknesses
in the institutions; the correctives, therefore, need to focus on a set of fundamental
institutional determinants.
To what
extent has the political system reacted to the malaise? A good example is the
First Report of the Ethics Committee of the Rajya Sabha, in December 1998. It
had this to say in its opening paragraphs:
‘Moral
and ethical concerns of the society weigh a great deal with those in public life
as their behaviour is keenly watched by the people. At concerned quarters views are being expressed over
the general decline in moral and ethical standards in public life. The Committee
has itself noted the general decline in moral and ethical standards in public
life. While the Committee felt that it was a serious trend, it did not, however,
fully share the despondency...
‘There
is a general feeling that all is not right with our political system which is
functioning under a great strain. In such a situation, the representatives of
the people have to set high standards of behaviour in public life. Members of
Parliament have not only to represent the society but have also to lead it. Therefore,
they have to function as the role models and this naturally casts on them a heavy
responsibility...
‘The Committee
notes that our freedom fighters and national leaders had set high ethical and
moral standards in public life and they followed those principles scrupulously.
This tendency, the Committee painfully observes, is now on a decline’.
The Report
addressed the question of criminalisation of politics and felt it could only be
tackled through self-regulatory mechanisms of political parties. It recommended
a model Code of Conduct, of a general nature, for the members of the Rajya Sabha.
The Third Report of the Ethics Committee, in August 2002, opined that ‘ethical
questions are mainly matters of one’s conscience’ and therefore cannot be dealt
entirely by legislation.
The argument
thus returns to its point of commencement. The imperative of ethics in public
life is eventually a matter of conscience, of morality, of a sense of values in
relation to right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, humane and cruel.
The perceived dichotomy between public and the private behaviour of individuals,
therefore, does not exist in ethical terms and must not exist in practice. It
follows that the individual, in relation to the State in any aspect of its functioning,
must act in an ethical manner; it then becomes the duty of the State as well as
of the civil society to ensure this through appropriate instrumentalities of law
as also of social pressures. Only then would we see the day when the corrupt would
not only be punished but also ostracized.
Conscience,
in other words, may need to be jostled from time to time. The duty of the State,
and of the civil society, is to be proactive in the matter. Only then would the
moral realm in public life become meaningful and make India of the future truly
free, just and humane. ”
SK/BS
(Release ID :33574)