The Vice President of
India Shri M. Hamid Ansari has said that a standardized image of an
Indian cannot be constructed; if presented, it is partial, incomplete,
misleading. India
nationalism and the dynamic of the Indian state demand a recognition and
appreciation of the existence of a plurality of identities, leaving it to the
individual citizen to accentuate or downplay any of these at a particular point
of time. Delivering Convocation address at “Annual Convocation of Banaras Hindu University
((BHU)” on the theme “Nationalism and Internationalism in the world
of tomorrow” at Varanasi (UP) today, he
has said that the latter perception does result, and has resulted, in
expressions of ethnic or mini-nationalisms and the emanating tensions. The
challenge of resolving them remains work in progress. Homogenization or
assimilation, however, is not the answer; it is neither feasible nor desirable.
Shri Ansari opined that a
de-nationalisation of the state appears to be in progress. We increasingly
encounter the role of supra-national and sub-national entities. On the one
hand, there are global problems that transcend national borders in their origin
and impact. Pandemics, climatic and environmental disasters and economic or
financial crises fall in this category and seek global solutions through
international consultation, cooperation, and enforcement. On the other hand, a
great many questions are better addressed by side-stepping the state at local
levels through civil society groups functioning as real and virtual global
communities.
Following is the text of the
Vice President’s convocation address :
Nationalism and Internationalism in the world of tomorrow
“Varanasi overwhelms, and
with good reason. The city of Lord
Shiva, referred to in the Rigveda as Kashi or ‘the
luminous one’, is a place of great antiquity as also of immense reverence. The
poet, Asadullah Khan Ghalib who spent a month in the city around the year 1820,
wrote a poem in Persian of one hundred and eight couplets in praise of it. A
few of these are indicative of the perception:
Ta’aal Allah Banaras
chashm-e-bad door
Bahisht-e-khurram o firdaus
maa’moor
May
God keep the evil eye away
From
this heavenly meadow of joy
Ba Gangish aks partau fugan shud
Banaras khood nazeer-e-khaishtan
shud
When
its beauty is reflected in the water of Ganges
Banaras becomes witness to its
own beauty
There can be,
have been, other descriptions of the city and its inhabitants. The Chinese
traveler Xuanzang testified to the religious, educational and cultural
centrality of the city. Tavernier praises its buildings but did not approve of
its narrow streets. The British orientalist Horace Wilson, quoted by Nirad
Chaudhury, cited a Sanskrit couplet (true in equal measure of all centres of
pilgrimage!) about the presence of religious vagabonds:
For those who are
ignorant of the revealed scriptures and sacred traditions, and who have
abandoned purity and proper conduct, and for those who have nowhere else to go,
for them Benares is the refuge.
Even the
timelessness of an ancient city does witness changes. The establishment of Banaras Hindu University
in 1916 was one such event of seminal significance. The name and fame of the
institution is in no need of commentary. Founded by Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya,
for generations of Indians the University has come to represent the national
spirit. It played a crucial role in the independence movement and has produced
many great freedom fighters and builders of modern India.
For more than
one reason, therefore, I am delighted to be amidst this gathering of scholars
and seekers of knowledge.
Convocations are occasions for introspection
and contemplation. A university brings together the
best mind of a generation. It is a place where enquiry is pushed forward and
discoveries made. It induces informed speculation. It is therefore an
appropriate forum for thinking about the future and the role in it of us as a
people at a time when the country has
taken meaningful steps towards a higher and inclusive economic and development
orbit and is geared to empowering millions of our citizens to lead lives of
dignity.
This quest
necessarily takes us to consider the domestic as well as the external
environment that would shape the future.
II
William Golding,
who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1983, described the twentieth century
as the most violent century in human history. It witnessed massacres and wars
and ended in global disorder. In the last decade of the century the historian
Eric Hobsbawm concluded that ‘our world risks both explosion and implosion. It
must change’.
The new century, whose first decade has
just ended, confronts this challenge. It is readily conceded that science,
technology and innovation would be increasingly vital to the health and wealth
of nations. A report, entitled The
Scientific Century, published last year by the Royal Society, London had this to say on
the subject:
No-one can predict the 21st century counterparts of
quantum theory, the double helix and
the internet. But there is little doubt that advances in science and technology
will continue to transform the way we live, create new industries and jobs, and
enable us to tackle seemingly intractable social and environmental problems…
Ten years into this new scientific century, the world is slowly
recovering from a severe financial
crisis. Food security, climate change and health inequalities are rising up
international policy agendas. And countries such as China,
India and Brazil are
reshaping the economic and political landscape.
The unstated premise of this thesis is
that it would modify, mould or change the way we think not only about
scientific challenges but also about social and political ones. We do know that
globalization and the interconnectedness of the contemporary world have induced
in some measure conceptual ‘globality’ or
consciousness of the world as one place. What we have not explored in
sufficient measure is the impact of this new consciousness on some of our most
cherished notions that have dominated thinking and shaped action for over two
centuries.
One of these is the concept of
nationalism.
Nationalism as a motivating force emerged
in Europe in early 19th century. As
an ideology it sought ‘the organs of a sovereign state through which to express
itself’. It exalted national interest, heightened rivalries and shaped history.
It provided ‘the glue that made possible the modern state and modern industry’.
It assumed aggressive dimensions and its overflow into imperial channels
resulted in much misery to the colonized people and caused justifiable
responses. It will be recalled that the world community formally expressed
itself against colonialism through the UN General Assembly Resolution 1415 of
December 1960. The actual process of decolonisation took a little longer.
Indian nationalism can best be described
as political articulation of anti-colonial consciousness. After independence
the new Indian state espoused a set of values focused on the attainment of
justice, equality, fraternity, democracy, religious tolerance, inclusive
economic development and cultural pluralism. Levels of actual achievement vary;
our commitment to them, nevertheless, is unwavering and has stood the test of
six decades.
In no period was Indian nationalism
xenophobic. It was and is accommodative and synthesizing. Its major premise is
an existential reality, namely the plural nature of our society. A democratic
polity and a secular state structure give shape to it and sustain and nurture
it. The end product has rightly been described as sui generis.
There was no dearth of sceptics. The
older, colonial, mindset about the absence and prospect of an Indian nation and
nationhood was supplemented by the emergence of new apprehensions about of
capacity to self-govern, of balkanization, of failure of the democratic
experiment, of overcoming the agony of the multitudes, were articulated. Others
had greater confidence; in August 1950 the British political scientist Earnest
Barker put the Preamble of our Constitution on the first page of his book Principles of Social and Political Theory because,
he said, it stated in a brief and pithy form the argument of the book. With one-sixth of the world’s population and
the closest reflection of the diversity of humanity, we have been rightly
called ‘the largest multicultural society in the world.’
The debate on
identity and nationalism was part of the discourse of our Freedom Movement and
was conducted with some vigour in the Constituent Assembly. It bore the impact
of global developments of that era. As a consequence, while the focus of the
Constitution was on the individual citizen it was also, in the words of a
distinguished academic, ‘well ahead of its time not only in recognizing
diversities but also in providing for representation of the collectivities in
the formal democratic structures.’
Closer scrutiny
shows that the multiple identities so recognized are amplified in our
Constitution for legal and operative purposes and total as many as thirteen -
identities grounded in religion; identities grounded in language; caste
identities; tribal identities; community identities, such as in the case of the
Anglo-Indian community; class identities, such as in the case of the socially
and educationally backward classes; racial identities, notably prohibiting
discrimination on grounds of race and permitting notification of specific races
or groups within races to be deemed to be Scheduled Castes; gender identities;
identities grounded in region, place of birth or residence, especially in the
context of prohibition of discrimination and provisions contained in Part XXI
of the Constitution; identities based on age, such as those provisions relating
to children and the aged; minority identities, whether based on religion,
language, script or culture; identities grounded in descent, especially in the context
of non-discrimination on grounds of descent; and identities based on
occupation, such as agricultural or industrial workers, defence personnel or
civil servants etc.
Accommodation of
diversity was thus consciously incorporated as a distinctive feature of the
Indian state. The special provisions for guarantees or affirmative action for
specific collectivities is evidence of an approach for securing justice and
sustaining multiple identities in a composite culture within a framework of a
quasi-federal structure, driven by an overriding imperative of maintaining
territorial integrity.
Consequently a
standardized image of an Indian cannot be constructed; if presented, it is
partial, incomplete, misleading. India nationalism and the dynamic
of the Indian state demand a recognition and appreciation of the existence of a
plurality of identities, leaving it to the individual citizen to accentuate or
downplay any of these at a particular point of time. The latter perception does
result, and has resulted, in expressions of ethnic or mini-nationalisms and the
emanating tensions. The challenge of resolving them remains work in progress.
Homogenization or assimilation, however, is not the answer; it is neither
feasible nor desirable.
One other
feature of Indian nationalism in its formative period was noteworthy. It had a
vision of the external world, not merely in terms of anti-colonialism but also
about India’s
approach to foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru expressed it on September 7, 1946
in his first statement as head of the Interim Government; he amplified it in a
speech in the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947. The conduct of foreign
affairs, he said, lay in ‘finding out what is most advantageous to the
country’. Article 51 of the Constitution set out for the Republic of India
its vision of foreign policy and inter-state relations. It helped define our
political identity and cultural individuality.
III
The experience of the modern Indian state
has been somewhat analogous to that of other states in the international
community. Sovereignty has been exercised to defend the state against external
and internal challenges, provide economic security and seek what is most
advantageous for the country and its citizens.
This quest for seeking what was in the
interest of the country was not always an altogether autonomous endeavour. The
second half of the twentieth century was a period of global transition in which
states, confronted with trans-national challenges, yielded some sovereign
prerogatives to larger, common, purposes. By the year 1992 Secretary General Boutros
Ghali was able to conclude that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty
had passed. He urged the member states of the United Nations ‘to find a balance between the need for good
internal governance and the requirement of an evermore interdependent world’.
It must be admitted candidly here that
the principle is easier to concede in theory than in practice. The reason lies
in the gap between the theory and practice of governance and in the imperative
of what has been conveniently taken under the rubric of ‘national interest’. As
a result, we have subscribed to most international norms on the one hand but at
times desisted from reading these into state policy and practice, on the other.
The ‘disconnect’ becomes visible in times of stress on some of the core issues
of governance.
Valid questions also arise about the
determination and articulation of ‘national interest’. The difficulty of
distinguishing between the sectional and transitory good, and the larger and
longer term good, comes to the fore. So does our explicit commitments to norms
of the global community and the need to reconcile them with the imperatives of
nationalism and state sovereignty.
It is evident that global issues by
definition respect no borders, by their complex nature overlap disciplines and,
by sharing a common ecosystem, are all in some way interrelated. Globalisation is a set of processes principally driven by new
technologies, new economic relationships and the national and international
policies of a wide range of actors, including governments, international
organizations, business and civil society.
Despite this, we do not naturally think in
global, inter-disciplinary, multi-factored ways. Two benchmarks, however, tend to influence
thinking and performance on this and related questions; the first relates to
the benefits that accrue from global thinking, the second to the obligations
arising out of it.
In recent years we have set for ourselves a
set of national objectives and others, observing the direction of our progress,
have delineated the levels of development likely to be achieved by the year
2040 or 2050. Alongside and on a shorter time span, we have subscribed to a set
of objectives incorporated in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals for the
year 2015. Both propel us, in different ways, to think globally. A scholar has rightly noted that ‘the structural conditions that
gave rise to modern nationalism have changed’.
Four sets of
broader considerations arising out of globalisation pose challenges to state
actors and to the state-system in the international order:
First, political globalization
is reflected in the reorientation of the international political order. Political
legitimacy and credibility have been linked to observance of norms pertaining
to governance, accountability, civil society and citizenry that have been
enunciated. This is most vividly observed in the post-cold war agenda of the United
Nations and particularly of the Security Council. The implementation of new
norms of human rights and of humanitarian intervention is illustrative and
instructive; so is the referral of cases to the International Criminal Court.
Second, economic globalization
manifesting itself through increased economic openness, growing economic
interdependence, and deepening economic integration in the world economy. These
confer both benefits and obligations.
Third, cultural
globalization in recent times has been characterized by de-territorialised
global production, distribution and consumption of cultural forms and
information. This has resulted in cultural products such as films, music and
sports of nations garnering significant revenue from, and exerting cultural
influence among, external territories or agents. The circumstances that have
enabled the emergence of today’s league sports and the film industry and their
peculiar global business models illustrate this point.
Fourth, a
de-nationalisation of the state appears to be in progress. We increasingly encounter
the role of supra-national and sub-national entities. On the one hand, there
are global problems that transcend national borders in their origin and impact.
Pandemics, climatic and environmental disasters and economic or financial crises
fall in this category and seek global solutions through international
consultation, cooperation, and enforcement. On the other hand, a great many
questions are better addressed by side-stepping the state at local levels
through civil society groups functioning as real and virtual global
communities.
Each one of the
above restrain the exercise of unbridled sovereignty internally and externally
and thereby brings about behavioural modifications on the part of the nation-state.
Despite these, countervailing
forces have also emerged. Globalization has produced a counter trend of
resurgence of nationalism and of an emphasis on national and cultural
identities. State actors have to contend with certain unhealthy trends
emanating from this counter trend, towards a homogenising nationalism that
flattens diversities, and has little respect for local cultures, value systems
and ways of life.
IV
As we enter the
second decade of the Twenty First Century and the sixth decade of our Republic,
a few questions come to mind:
- How do our citizens view their
role in the Indian state, in sub-national, provincial and local units, and
in supra-national regional and international organizations?
- Can accommodation of group rights,
diversities, identities and status in a democratic state setup continue in
a period of political or economic shock or crisis? Will common people, and
their leaders, forsake an approach of multiculturalism for the assumed
comfort of nationalism at the first sight of contraction of economic
opportunity or political space?
- How will the states-system deal
with trans-national political, economic and cultural communities,
especially when these are based on ethnicity, language, economic interest
or political congruence?
Answers to these
questions would have a bearing on the continuing debate about nationalism and
internationalism. The Indian model, in fact, may be of increasing relevance to
the outside world in some parts of which questions are being raised about the
efficacy and desirability of a multicultural approach.
In a lecture a
few years back in New Delhi on ‘The
Nation-State in the Global Age’, the sociologist Anthony Giddens had concluded
that ‘creating cosmopolitan nations – with an overall identity but happy in
their diversity – is the main way in which an effective international agenda
can be forged and furthered’.
I congratulate
the students graduating today and wish them success and happiness in the world
beyond the portals of this great university.I also thank the Chancellor Dr.
Karan Singh ji, and BHU for inviting me to this Convocation.”
SK